We consider the effects of voluntary international environmental protocols on emissions with regard to the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol on the reduction of sulphur oxides. Our analysis utilizes panel data from 30 European countries for the period 1960-2002. We divide these countries into "participants" and "non-participants", i.e., those that did and those that did not ratify the specific protocol. We use a difference-in-difference estimator that focuses on the difference in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and compares it with this difference for non-participant countries. Difference-in-difference estimation methods rely on annual data and may induce serial correlations in the variables. We use randomly generated placebo protocols to test the estimated effects. In a panel data regression model, where we include country and year dummies, the effect of the Helsinki agreement in reducing sulphur emissions is around three per cent per year, and the effect of the Oslo agreement is around four per cent per year. Correcting the standard errors for serial correlation in both dependent and independent variables is important and overlooked in the previous empirical literature on the evaluation of international agreements.
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Introduction
Success in managing global public goods and commons is important for our future welfare. Examples of global public goods include global warming, maintenance of international macroeconomic stability, international trade rules, international political stability, humanitarian assistance, and knowledge. Institutions for managing international public goods include international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol on emission reduction of greenhouse gases, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations. Public goods crossing national jurisdictional borders add a dimension to Samuelson's (1954) general theory for public goods. Under the current international law, obligations may be imposed only on a sovereign state with its consent. Hence, multinational institutions and international agreements often have weak or even lack explicit control and enforcement mechanisms.
Compliance with agreements is often hard to control and verify, and moreover, there are seldom explicit sanction mechanisms in these agreements. With this in mind, it is reasonable to address the question of whether these institutions work or not.
In this paper, we address this question by evaluating two specific international Even though there are contradictory results from studies evaluating international environmental agreements, most of the economics literature concludes that they "tend to codify Nash behaviour and, as such, do not present much of a co-operative gain" (Arce et al. 2001, p. 494) . 3 As far as we know, the 1994 Oslo Protocol has not yet been evaluated by an econometric approach, but the 1985 Helsinki Protocol has undergone quantitative assessment. Levy (1993) , and Helm and Sprinz (2000) find that the 1985 Helsinki Protocol reduced sulphur emissions further than expected reductions without the protocol. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) criticizes these studies for failure to take into account the fact that ratification of the Protocol is not random but a result of a self-selection decision process. They find that the 1985 Helsinki Protocol has had no significant effect on sulphur emissions.
To control for the self-selection process, we use programme evaluation methods, and difference-in-difference estimations in particular, to control for observed and unobserved 4 factors affecting emission levels. 4 Difference-in-difference estimation focuses on the difference in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and compares it with this difference for non-signatory countries. Identification of the effect is obtained by repeated annual observations of emissions from signatories and non-signatories as a control group both before and after the signing date. We use a very flexible panel data model that allows for country-specific growth effects, and standard country and year effects.
We expand on the econometric framework of Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) we look at relative changes in emissions rather than absolute levels in the difference-indifference model. This is important in models with potential selection bias because we allow for both the level and yearly changes in emissions to be different for the different treatment groups prior to the signing period. In addition, difference-in-difference estimation methods rely on annual data and this may induce serial correlations in the variables. In particular, the variable in evaluation focus-signing an agreement-will be serial correlated. Overlooking this may, as demonstrated by Bertrand et al. (2003) , introduce biased estimates of the standard errors. To overcome this bias, we follow Bertrand et al. (2003) and use for inference the empirical distributions of estimated effects for placebo signatories.
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Our results contradict those found in Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005) for the 1985
Helsinki Protocol. In a panel data regression model, where we include country and year dummies, and look at relative changes in emissions within the difference-in-difference framework, the effect of the Helsinki agreement in reducing sulphur emissions is estimated to be around three per cent per year, and the effect of the Oslo agreement is estimated to be around four per cent per year. These effects are significantly different from zero in most of our model specifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the historical background for the two protocols. In section 3, we outline our econometric approach, emphasizing programme evaluation principles and methods for utilizing placebo protocols. In section 4, we present data, and in Section 5, we discuss the results. Finally, Section 6 brings some concluding remarks.
Background
Environmental problems that cross national borders require some form of international cooperation. The large number of multilateral agreements on environmental problems is evidence that this challenge is addressed. By 1994, according to Barrett (1994, p. 878 
Empirical modelling
Our aim is to evaluate the effect of a specific agreement on the signatories' sulphur emissions. In particularly, we investigate whether signatories reduce their emissions more than they would have done without this agreement. Clearly, reduction of emissions is a restricted measurement of success, and many agreements have other goals. For example, the 1994 Oslo Protocol on sulphur emissions also focuses on damage caused by the pollutants, as the deposition of oxidized sulphur should not exceed specified critical loads (see Appendix 2), and cost-efficient emission reduction. As we are focusing on emission reduction, we overlook success along other dimensions of a protocol. However, we believe that reduction in emissions is one of the key measurements of success.
We measure the effect over a long time span, as the intention of these protocols is to change emission policy over a long period. In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, the aim is to 
The random growth model for county i at time t is given by:
where the parameters i c and i g are country fixed effects and country annual growth effects, respectively. The annual effects of the two protocols are captured by the parameters ( 2 1 , δ δ ). Differentiating the random growth model in (1) with respect to t, we obtain:
where Δ is the time difference operator, for example
. The interpretation of the coefficients in the level model (1) and the difference model (2) is the same;
however, the assumption about the error term is different. This will have consequences for the estimation of the standard error of the coefficients in our model. In particular, model (1) is generally ridden with serial correlation (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002; Bertrand et al., 2003; Helland and Tabarrok, 2004) . Both specifications are estimated using OLS with country-specific fixed effects.
The treatment effect of protocol p at time p T t ∈ , i.e., 
(ii) Pretreatment relative change for the group of signatories is the same as it would have been without signing the protocol, i.e., there is no adjustment in the pre-signing period. Hence, as an estimator for the annual effect for protocol p we utilize:
which is the difference-in-difference model for yearly changes in emissions.
Serial correlation and randomized protocols
As we remarked in the introduction, estimation of equation (1) by OLS is subject to a possible serial correlation. Clearly, as we model emissions using time differences ( it Y Δ ), we reduce the potential serial correlation in the dependent variable compared with estimating a model using the level of emissions ( it Y ) as the dependent variable. However, the treatment variables in themselves, p it D , are highly correlated over time for a given country. If country i signed protocol p in year t, it will also have signed the protocol in the years afterwards. This serial correlation will induce biased estimates of the standard errors of the estimated effects ( p δ ) (see Wooldridge, 2002; Bertrand et al., 2003) . The direction of the bias depends on serial correlations in the error terms and the explanatory variables. In a simple model with one explanatory variable with a first-order serial correlation in the independent variable and a first-order correlation for the error term, the bias is downward if the serial correlation in the error term and independent variable are positive. The estimated standard errors are smaller than true standard errors in this case.
If the first-order correlation in error terms is negative, the estimated standard errors are too large. To overcome the potential problem with serial correlation, we follow Bertrand et al. (2003) and use randomization inference by estimating the effect and standard deviation of placebo signatories. We expand the placebo framework used in the literature and suggest several different randomization strategies. In general, we generate placebo protocols P by randomly assigning a protocol by country and year, p it P , and estimate the effects using OLS.
We generate 1000 random placebo protocols, and generate the distributions of p γ denoted by (.) G p for p = 1, 2. Assuming the model is correctly specified, the mean of the 13 distribution is zero because randomly choosing protocols should have no effect on emissions. The average number of randomly drawn country-years is the same as the number in the actual sample signing the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol. 9 We perform 1000 independent draws of ( 2 1 , it it P P ). For each draw, we run the regression in equation (3).
The randomization of placebo protocols is drawn in four different ways depending on assumptions about both the data-generating process and the structural properties of the parameters in the model. (i) We assume that the effect of a protocol, i.e., the parameter p γ , is independent of time. This assumption means that the effect of the protocol in the first year is the same whether the protocol started in 1970 or in 1990. 10 We label this assumption that the effect is structural or path independent. In the randomization algorithm, a placebo protocol is drawn randomly for each country-year in the whole observation period 1961-2002 such as the average country-years active placebo protocols are the same as in the actual sample. For example, the first drawn placebo protocol may be the year 1961 for a specific country but not the following year for the same country.
(ii) We still assume that the effect is structural. However, we restrict the placebo protocols to be in place in the same consecutive number of years as the actual protocol.
Each year we randomly draw a country to be a part of a placebo protocol or not. If a country is drawn to be part of the placebo protocol, it will be part of the protocol for succeeding years such that the total average number of years is the same as that for the observed 1985 Helsinki Protocol and 1994 Oslo Protocol. (iii) We assume that the effect is restricted to the actual period of the protocols, i.e., the parameter p γ is only defined in the actual protocol period, T p . This assumption, we take to mean, as the effect is path dependent and not a structural phenomenon. In the randomization algorithm, a placebo protocol is drawn randomly for each p T t ∈ . This implies that a country may be in a placebo protocol p in the first year T p but may not be in the second year. (iv) Finally, we assume that the effect is restricted to the actual signatory period as in (iii), and that the effect of protocol p is defined for the whole period T p . A placebo protocol is drawn randomly for the whole period T p . This means that if a country is drawn to be in a placebo protocol the first year in the actual protocol period T p , the protocol indicator variable, it P , is constant for the rest of the actual period T p .
Even though we report standard errors for all four randomization strategies, they differ in the assumption about the data-generation process and whether our parameters are assumed to be structural or not. Randomization strategy (iv) replicates our data perfectly except that the protocol country is randomly drawn and the placebo effect is restricted to an actual period. However, the time dimension is irrelevant if the effect of a protocol is a structural parameter, meaning that the effect is not time dependent and we allow for it to be in other periods as well. In this case, we draw placebo protocols for the entire observation period as in randomization strategies (i) and (ii). In (ii), we assume that the protocol period is fixed, which is not the case in (i).
To test the null hypothesis of no effect of signing a protocol, we check whether the estimate of six signed neither of these protocols (see Table 1 ). The 1985 Helsinki Protocol was signed on 9 July in 1985, and we assume that the period of potential effect is 1986-93.
The 1994 Oslo Protocol was signed on 14 June in 1994, and we assume that the effect is from 1995 until 2002.
( For both protocols, the annual growth for the median signatory country is below that for the median non-signatory countries in the protocol periods, but even though the picture for pre-protocols is somewhat mixed, it seems as though annual growth for median signatory countries is below that for the median non-signatory countries. Summing up, the raw data seem to indicate that both protocols worked. For more accurate statements, we now turn to the econometric analyses.
( Figure 3 about here)
Results and analyses
The results from the regression model given in differentiated form in equation (2) are given in Table 2 below. Except for the participation and transition country dummies, the variables are in logarithm and time differenced; thus, their coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. Our preferred specification of the model includes controls for both year effects and country-specific growth effects in the differentiated model. We also include the results from a regression with no year and country growth effects (model I in Table   2) , and a regression model where we include year effects but not country-specific growth effects (model II in Table 2 ). It turns out that allowing for country-specific growth effects in emissions is important, because countries vary substantially in emission trajectories.
Thus, in the discussion, we will focus on model III in Table 2 , because this offers the most flexible modelling of changes in emissions over time.
From Table 2 , model III, we see that a one per cent increase in gross domestic product will increase emissions by 0.45 per cent. The population variable is not significantly different from zero in our preferred model (model III). In the former communist countries in Eastern Europe, the annual relative change in emissions is between minus three and four per cent annually. However, this effect is not statistically different from zero in model III where we allow for country-specific growth effects.
( Table 2 about here)
Turning to the main variables of this paper, we see that, without controlling for time and country effects (model I in Table 2 Model III in Table 2 includes both a common yearly growth rate and a country-specific yearly growth rate in emissions independent of the protocol variables, and is our preferred model. We see that the effect of the protocols is reduced to 3.1 per cent for the Helsinki Protocol and 4.0 for the Oslo Protocol. The robust standard errors for these estimates are 0.021 and 0.025 respectively. Thus, the coefficient estimates are not significant at the 10 per cent level for a two-sided test.
To investigate the serial correlation for the dependent variable, we estimate serial correlations from regressions on time differences of emissions ( Table B2 , and they are not significantly different from zero. The correlation coefficients between the residual and lagged values of the residuals are also very small (see Table B .3).
The serial correlation coefficients in Table B and year and country dummies (see Table C .2 in Appendix C). This model is estimated from equation (1) error from the level model is much smaller than the standard error for the difference model. This is according to theory. Positive serial correlation in the error term will cause standard errors to be understated, and this will be exaggerated if we also have serial correlation in the independent variables (see Helland and Tabarrok, 2004) . The problem with serial correlation is much smaller for the difference model given in equation (2) compared to the level model in equation (1).
We estimate the standard errors for the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols in case of serial correlation in the dependent and/or independent variables using placebo protocols. The empirical distributions of the effect of the placebo protocols are given in Figure 4 for the 20 Helsinki Protocol and in Figure 5 for the Oslo Protocol. As expected, the placebo effects are normally distributed with mean value zero. The standard errors for the four different randomization strategies are given in Table 3 for the Helsinki Protocol and the Oslo Protocol.
The standard errors vary slightly depending on our randomization strategy. The standard error increases monotonically from specification (i) to specification (iv) (see Table 3 and
Figures 4 and 5). In addition, we find that the standard errors are smaller in the placebo experiments compared with the robust standard errors as reported in Table 2 , except for the standard error for the Oslo Protocol using randomization strategy (iv).
The estimated standard errors for the Helsinki Protocol and the Oslo Protocol using randomization strategy (i) are 0.013 and 0.011, respectively. Thus, the estimated yearly effects of both protocols are significantly different from zero at the one per cent level. If we use randomization strategy (ii), the estimated standard errors are 0.016 and 0.014 for both the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols, respectively. Thus, the Helsinki Protocol is significant at the 10 per cent level, while the Oslo Protocol is significant at the five per cent level. The same conclusion is reached using randomization strategy (iii), where the estimated standard error for both protocols is 0.018. The estimated effect for the Helsinki Protocol using randomization strategies (ii) and (iii) is significant at the five per cent level for a one-sided test, while the Oslo Protocol is significant at the one per cent level for a one-sided test. Lastly, the estimated standard errors from strategy (iv) are 0.019 and 0.031 for the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols, respectively. Thus, the estimated coefficients ( 2 1, δ δ ) are not significantly different from zero in this case.
As we mentioned earlier, we do not expect the effect of protocols to be counterproductive, i.e., the estimate of We divide these countries into "participants" and "non-participants", i.e., those that did and those that did not ratify the specific protocol. We use a difference-in-difference estimator that focuses on differences in emissions before and after signing a specific protocol and comparing this with the differences for non-participating countries. We find that the annual reduction in emissions due to the Helsinki Protocol is three per cent, and four per cent for the 1995 Oslo Protocol. To overcome the problem of biased standard errors, we follow Bertrand et al. (2003) and compute the difference-in-difference estimates for 1000 randomly 22 generated placebo protocols. We include several different randomization strategies depending on the data-generating process and assumptions about the parameters in our model. We use the empirical distribution of placebo effects to test whether the estimated effects are significantly different from zero. The estimated effects are significant in some of our models, but not robust to different randomization strategies for placebo protocols.
Thus, even though the annual effects of the two protocols in terms of reduced sulphur emissions are estimated at three per cent for the Helsinki Protocol and four per cent for the Oslo Protocol, the estimated standard errors indicate that a definitive conclusion about the effectiveness of these protocols cannot be reached. Table 2 for different assumptions about the structural draw and the draw. Table 2 for different assumptions about the structural draw and the draw. 
